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regarding protection of investments and dispute resolution settlement.
Part III of the ECT, on the investment promotion and protection, recalls
the substantive protection offered by modem bilateral and multilateral
investment/trade agreements. This article examines the so-called "denial
of benefits" clause under Article 17 of the ECT. The "denial of benefits"
clause was inserted in investment treaties for at least two purposes: to
maintain reciprocity or asymmetry with regard to the benefits arising out
of the protection offered by investment treaties, and to exclude from the
protection of the treaties the so-called "shell companies." The first part
of this article will take a brief look at the historical evolution of the
clause and how it was approached by the tribunals set up in accordance
with the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States.1 In the second part, we offer some
concise commentary relating to the scope and interpretation of Article 17
of the ECT as well as a discussion of the approach taken by the arbitral
tribunals on the application of the "denial of benefits" clause under the
ECT.
I.

"DENIAL OF BENEFITS" CLAUSE: AN OVERVIEW

A.

Evolution of the "denialof benefits" clause in internationallaw on
foreign investments. Treaties of Friendship,Commerce and
Navigation. BilateralandMultilateralInvestment/Trade Treaties

From the historical perspective of the international law on foreign
investment, the purpose of the "denial of benefits" clause was to exclude
third parties from claiming the benefits of the Treaty without assuming
the obligations therein: such prohibition was specifically directed at
"enemy companies." Originally used to deny diplomatic protection, the
clause was later imported into the treaties concerning protection of
foreign investments.
In 1956, Walker Jr., while discussing the provision on companies in
the U.S. treaties, explained the "denial of benefits" provision as a
safeguard against "free riders"-nationals of third countries who would
gain rights or interests despite the fact that the contracting states to the
treaty did not wish to accord them those benefits.2 Referring to the

1. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Washington, entered into force on 14 October 1966. The
Convention shall be hereinafter referred to as "the ICSID Convention." The International
Centre for settlement of Investment Disputes, set up by the ICSID Convention, shall be
referred to as "ICSID" or the "Centre."
2. Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 388 (1956).
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"denial of benefits" clause contained in the early Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation ("FCNs") signed by the U.S., Walker Jr.
described them as "a latent protective clause which a party may utilize if
it wishes to take the initiative of so doing." 3 In 1990, Salacuse noted that
it is a basic task of the Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") to
determine whether an investor has a sufficient link to a treaty country.
Determining which investors are covered by the treaty "also reveals the
asymmetry in the relationship between the two countries. ' 4 According to
Salacuse, allowing the benefits of the BITs to nationals of third countries
or to those who are "primarily associated" with those countries and with
which the denying country has no relationship, would be "to abandon...
[the] right to negotiate corresponding privileges and obligations from
those countries." ' 5 The "denial of benefits" clause is therefore seen as a
safety measure for safeguarding the principle of reciprocity embodied in
investment treaties.
In 2008, Dolzer and Schreuer considered the "denial of benefits"
right as a "method to counteract nationality planning."6 States often
oppose investors' nationality planning by inserting certain requirement in
the BITs. Some BITs "require a bond of economic substance between
the corporation and the state," 7 while others insert the "denial of
benefits" clause. Dolzer and Schreuer explained the denial clause as
follows:
Under such a clause the states reserve the right to deny the benefits of
the treaty to a company that does not have an economic connection to
the state on whose nationality it relies. The economic connection
would consist in control by nationals of the
8 state of nationality or in
substantial business activities in that state.

3. Id. Walker Jr. also points out that the clause (or "reservation", as he calls it) is
"directed primarily at the exercise by a company of its "functional" rather than its "civil"
capacity." That is, the fact that the State denies the benefits of the investment treaty does
not trigger the denial of nationality or existence of the respective entity, nor-as
expressly mentioned in some FCNs-the access of these entities to courts.
4. J.W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Their Impact of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655, 665

(1990).
5. Id.
6.

RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT LAW 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).

7. Id.
8. Id.
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The "denial of benefits" clause seems to have its origins in the FCNs
concluded by the U.S. after 1945. 9 Later on, the clause was introduced in
modem bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
U.S. and China, signed in 1946, states that
each High Contracting Party reserves the right to deny any of the
rights and privileges accorded by this Treaty to any corporation or
association created or organized under the laws and regulations of the
other High Contracting Party which is directly or indirectly owned or
controlled, through majority stock ownership or otherwise, by
nationals, 10corporations or associations of any third country or
countries.
Similarly, the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand,
signed in 1966, provides that nothing shall preclude the denial of the
advantages of the Treaty to "any company in the ownership or direction
of which nationals of any third country or countries have directly or
indirectly the controlling interest."11 However, this denial of benefits
clause does not apply to "recognition of juridical status and with respect
to access to courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and
agencies."12
In an early commentary of the U.S. BITs, it is mentioned that the
purpose of the denial of benefits clause is to "allow either party to
determine whether to extend treaty benefits when involvement by
nationals of either party is relatively minor., 13 The clause is often
inserted in the definition part of the Treaties or sometimes as a distinct
article. 14
9. In pre-1945 FCNs we can find incipient forms of the "denial of benefits" clause.
For example, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with FinalProtocol
between the United States of America and Siam, signed on 13 November 1937, provides
in Article 1(8) that "neither High Contracting Party shall be required by anything in this
paragraph to grant any application for any such right or privilege [exploration and
exploitation of mineral resources] if at any time such application is presented the grating
of all similar applications shall have been suspended or discontinued."
10. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of China, signed on 4 November 1946 and entered into force
on 30 November 1948, in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 27, 48 art. XXVI(5) (1949).
11. Thailand-U.S. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed on 29 May
1966, in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 876, 884 art. XII(1)(f) (1966).
12. Id. The same provision can be found in Article XIII(l)(e) of the Treaty ofAmity
and Economic Relations between the United States of America and the Togolese
Republic, signed on 8 February 1966.
13. P.B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L.
373, 379-80 (1985).
14. For instance, both the 1994 and 2004 U.S. Model BIT assigned a separate article
for this clause (Article XXII and Article 17, respectively). However, some BITs signed
by the US in 1993-1994 contain the "denial of benefits" clause in the article reserved for
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The "denial of benefits" clause was included in the 1994 U.S.
Model BIT and reads as follows:
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the other Party
the benefits of this Treaty if nationals of a third country own or
control the company and
a) the denying Party does not maintain normal economic
relations with the third country; or
b) the company has no substantial business activities in the
territory of the Party under whose laws it is constituted or
organized. 15
In a commentary preceding the text of the U.S.-Jordan BIT, concluded
based on the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, the U.S. explains that "a non-Party
country with which the denying Party does not have normal economic
relations" includes, for example, a country upon which the U.S. is
applying economic sanctions, such as Cuba. 16 A clarification is provided
for the second paragraph of the clause. According to the commentary,
"this provision would not generally permit the United States to deny
benefits to a company of Jordan that maintains its central administration
or principal place of business in the territory of, or has a real and
continuous link with, Jordan."' 7
The 2004 U.S. Model BIT provides for a more elaborate clause, in
line with the provisions of the Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") signed
by the U.S. after 1994:
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the
other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to

definitions. For example, The Treaty between United States ofAmerica and the Republic
of Kyrgyzstan concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
signed on 19 January 1993, provides under Article 1(2) that
[e]ach party reserves the right to deny to any company the advantages of this
Treaty if nationals of any third country control such company and, in the case
of a company of the other Party, that company has no substantial business
activities in the territory of the other Party or is controlled by nationals of a
third country with which the denying Party does not maintain normal economic
relations.
15. 1994 U.S. Model BIT, in CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE, &
MATTHEW

WEINIGER,

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

ARBITRATION:

SUBSTANTIVE

PRINCIPLES 386-92 app. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
16. The commentary and the text of the Treaty between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed on 2
July 1995, are available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43565.pdf.
17. Id.
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investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control
the enterprise and the denying Party:
a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or
b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or
a person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the
enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the
benefits of this Treaty were accorded to the enterprise or to its
investments.
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the
other Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to
investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial
business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a
non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.18
Both U.S. Model BITs deny the benefits of the Treaty. The wording can
be explained bearing in mind the structure and content of a BIT. Unlike
FTAs or other Multilateral Treaties which contain only limited
provisions in respect to investments,' 9 BITs include exclusively
provisions with regard to investments. This difference is arguably the
reason why the FTAs and other treaties limit the applicability of the
clause only to the section or chapter regulating the investment related
issues. Quite often, these treaties include the investor-state dispute
resolution mechanism with regard to protection of investments in the
same section or chapter with the "denial of benefits" clause.
In line with the U.S. policy, the United States-Australia Free Trade
Agreement ("US-Australia FTA") provides for the same "denial of
benefits" clause as the one contained in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.20
A similar provision is found in the Agreement between Japan and
the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic
Relationship ("Japan-Mexico FTA"). The Japan-Mexico FTA contains
an additional requirement on behalf of the contracting parties: where the
investor has no substantial business in the territory of the contracting
2004 U.S. Model BIT, in MCLACHLAN ETAL., supra note 15, at 393 app. 6.
19. For example, the Energy Charter Treaty regulates four areas in the energy sector:
investments, trade, transit and dispute settlement.
20. The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, signed on 18 May, 2004,
and entered into force on 1 January 2005, art. 11.12. It should be mentioned that the
"denial of benefits" provision is contained in Chapter 11 of the FTA, while the dispute
settlement provisions are laid down in Chapter 21. Interesting however, Chapter 11
makes an indirect reference to Chapter 21 by including a provision regarding
consultations to be carried out by the Parties prior to any investor-state dispute
settlement.
18.
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party, the "denial of benefits clause" may only operate subject to prior
notification and consultation. 2' An identical "denial of benefits" clause
is contained in the CAFTA/DR 2
The "denial of benefits" clause is no longer a provision which can
be found only in the investment treaties signed by the U.S. Other
countries have included the "denial of benefits" clause in their bilateral
investment treaties. For instance, the Jordan-Austria BIT provides that a
contracting party may deny the benefits of an agreement to investors and
investments of the other contracting party if the investor is owned or
controlled by investors of a third party and the investor has no substantial
business activity in the territory of the denying Party. 23 The 2004
Canadian Model BIT incorporates in Article 18 a denial of benefits
clause similar to the one found in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.24 The 2004
Canadian Model BIT allows the denial of benefits to companies with no
substantial business activity subject to prior notification and

consultation.2 5
21. The Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the
Strengtheningof the Economic Relations, signed on 17 September 2004 and entered into
force on 1 April 2005, art. 70. The FTA does not contain a detailed procedure for
notification and consultation. The FTA refers to the denial of benefits "of this Chapter."
Different from the US-Australia FTA, the "denial of benefits" clause under the JAPANMexico FTA is contained in the same chapter as the dispute settlement provisions. For
more discussion and an example of the notification and consultation procedure, see infra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
22. Central American/Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.12. The
agreement was entered into force as follows: between US and El Salvador, on 1 March
2006; between US and Honduras, on 1 April 2006; between US and Guatemala, on 1 July
2006; between US and the Dominican Republic, on 1 March 2007; the ratification by
Costa Rica is still pending. Unlike the Japan-Mexico FTA, the CAFTA/DR has special
provisions regarding notification (art. 18.3) and consultation (art. 20.4). Also, the
investor-state dispute settlement is contained in the same Chapter with the "denial of
benefits" clause.
23. The Agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of
Austriafor the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 23 January 2001 and
entered into force on 25 November 2001, art. 10. Other BITs include the reference to the
substantial business activity in the definition of investor. For example, the Agreement
between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Argentina
on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 29 July 1993,
provides, among others, for the applicability of the BIT to "any legal person constituted
in accordance with the laws and regulations of a Contracting Party and having its seat
together with real economic activities in the territory of that Contracting Party"
[emphasis added] and to "any legal person wherever located which is effectively
controlled by natural persons of a Contracting Party or by legal persons having its seat
together with real economic activities in the territory of that Contracting Party"
[emphasis added].
24. The 2004 Canadian Model BIT, art. 18, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
25. Id. The "denial of benefits" clause makes reference to "notification and
consultation in accordance with Article 19. Article 19 does not provide per se for such
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The "denial of benefits" clause can be found in Article 1113 of the
NAFTA 26 and serves two main purposes: to deny benefits to entities
with which the contracting states have no diplomatic relations, or upon
which it is applying economic sanctions; and to deny benefits to
enterprises with no substantial activity in the contracting state.2 7 The
application of Article 1113 of the NAFTA is subject to prior notification
and consultation. A contracting state denying the benefits to an entity
must give prior notification to the contracting state of which the entity in
question is asserting to be a national. 28 Further, consultations must be
conducted as provided for by Articles 1803 and 2006 of the NAFTA.
The commentators of the NAFTA see the consultation requirement as "a
safeguard preventing a too-hasty decision on the real nationality of an
enterprise by permitting the other Party to provide information about the
alleged 'sham' corporation... ,,29 The "denial of benefits" clause

procedure, as it mainly regulates transparency issues. Nevertheless, Article 19(2) reads
as follows:
To the extent possible, each Party shall:
(a) publish in advance any such [laws, regulations, procedures, and
administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered
by this Agreement] measure that it proposes to adopt; and
(b) provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity
to comment on such proposed measures.
26. The North American Free Trade Agreement, entered into force on January 1,
1994 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 1113 of the NAFTA provides the following:
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another
Party that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investor if
investors of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the denying Party:
a. does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or
b. adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party that
prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or
circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the
enterprise or to its investments.
2. Subject to prior notification and consultation in accordance with Articles
1803 (Notification and Provision of Infornation) and 2006 (Consultations), a
Party may deny the benefits of this Chapterto an investor of another Party that
is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investors if investors
of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no
substantial business activities in the territory of the Party under whose law it is
constituted or organized. [emphasis added]
27.

MEG KINNEAR, ANDREA BJORKLUND, & JOHN F.G. HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT

DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11,

1113-15

(Kluwer Law, June 2006).
28. NAFTA, supra note 26, at art. 1113(2).
29. KINNEAR, BJORKLUND, & HANNAFORD, supra note 27, at
1 1113-16.
Nevertheless, the commentators acknowledge that the requirement of such prior
notification is "somehow unclear" and it "most likely means that, before asserting Article
1113 as a defense before a tribunal, the respondent Party must notify, and commence
consultations with, the Party in which the claimant is located." Id.
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operates within the framework of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, which
also includes an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism.
The "denial of benefits" clause was also imported into the Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 30 After establishing that, for purposes
of diplomatic protection, the State of nationality is the state where the
entity is incorporated, Article 9 of the Draft Articles provides an
exception which reads as follows:
when a corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or
States and has no substantial business activities in the State of
incorporation, and the seat of management and the financial control
of the corporation are both located in
another State, that State shall be
31
regarded as the State of nationality.
It is worth mentioning that unlike FCNs and other investment
treaties, Article 9 mentioned above imposes three cumulative conditions
for denying the diplomatic protection to an entity incorporated in the
denying state: first, the corporation is controlled by nationals of other
states; second, the corporation has no substantial business activity in the
state of incorporation; and lastly, the seat located in the state of
incorporation is neither the seat of management, nor the seat of financial
control.3 2
B.

The Scope of the "Denialof Benefits" Clause Under the Case Law
of the InternationalLaw of ForeignInvestments

The "denial of benefits" provision was discussed by ICSID arbitral
tribunals in disputes based on BITs and NAFTA. Article 17(1) of the
ECT was invoked in the ICSID case Plama v. Bulgaria.33 As Plama is
one of the central points of discussion for this study, the Decision on
Jurisdiction and the Award 34 shall be discussed in Section 11.2 below.
In Waste Management II v. Mexico, 35 the tribunal referred to the
"denial of benefits" clause in Article 1113 of the NAFTA while
30. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, adopted in 2006 by the International
Law Commission, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%
20articles/982006.pdf.

31. Id. at art. 9.
32. Id.
33. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A. J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder] (Feb. 8, 2005)
(Decision on Jurisdiction).

34. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A. J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder] (Aug. 27,
2008) (Award).
35. Waste Management, Inc. (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 [J. Crawford, President, E.M. G6mez, BR. Civiletti] (April 30,

2004) (Award), 43 ILM 967 (2004).
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discussing the status of the claimant as an "investor." The tribunal
viewed Article 1113 as including a condition for commencing arbitration
under NAFTA.36 The clause was seen by the tribunal as addressing
"situations where the investor is simply an intermediary for interests
substantially foreign and it allows NAFTA protections to 3be
withdrawn
7
in such cases subject to prior notification and consultation.
The tribunals in Pan American Energy and BP Argentina
Exploration v. Argentina and BP America Production Company v.
Argentina38 addressed the issue of the denial of benefits under Article
1(2) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, 39 but rejected its application as Pan
American Energy was directly and indirectly controlled by two U.S.
companies (BP Argentina and BP America) that had substantial business
activity in the U.S. It is noteworthy to mention that the tribunal
discussed the clause as part of the preliminary objections.4 °
The tribunal in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine4' also discussed the
applicability of the "denial of benefits" provision. The respondent
invoked the clause under Article 1(2) of the U.S.-Ukraine BIT,42 which
provided that a contracting party may deny the benefits of the BIT to
companies established in either contracting party, controlled by nationals
of third countries, if these companies have no substantial business
activity in the denying state or the third countries are the ones with which
the denying party maintain no normal economic relations. The tribunal
addressed the "denial of benefits" clause as a preliminary issue and
dismissed respondent's claims as to the applicability of the clause
because a U.S. citizen owned 100% of the share capital of the claimant.43
The tribunal briefly touched upon the burden of proof under these
36. Id. at 80.
37. Id.
38. Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America Production
Company, Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina SRL and Pan American
Continental SRL v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8 [L.
Caflisch ,President, A.J. van den Berg, B. Stem] § 111(8) (July 25, 2006) (Decision on
Preliminary Objections).
39. The Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments between the Argentine Republic and the United States of America, signed on
November 14, 1991.
40. Pan American Energy and BP Argentina Exploration v. Argentina, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, and BP America Production Company v. Argentina, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8, 205.
41. Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/9 [J.
Paulsson, President, E. Salpius, J. Voss] (Sept. 16, 2003) (Award), 44 ILM 404 (2005),
§ 11.15.
42. Treaty between the United States of America and Ukraine concerning the
EncouragementandReciprocal Protectionof Investment, signed on 4 March 1994.
43. Generation Ukraine Inc., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/9 at 15.9.
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circumstances and held that "the burden of proof to establish the factual
basis of the 'third country control,' together with the other conditions,
falls upon the State as the party invoking the 'right to deny' conferred by
Article I(2)."' 4
In Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine,45 Ukraine argued that the claimant has
no "genuine link" with Lithuania, the country of incorporation, as it is
owned and controlled by Ukrainian nationals.46 Additionally, the
claimant had no substantial business activities in Lithuania and had its
administrative headquarters in Ukraine, rather than in Lithuania.4 7 Based
on this fact, the tribunal should have found that the claimant was not
entitled to the protection offered by the Ukraine Lithuania BIT 48 and the
ICSID Convention. The tribunal held that the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT
contains no "denial of benefits" provision. The Tribunal saw the absence
of this clause as a "deliberate choice of the Contracting Parties., 49 It was
further noted that "it is not for tribunals to impose limits on the scope of
BITs not found in the text.... An international tribunal of defined
jurisdiction should not reach out to exercise a jurisdiction beyond the
borders of the definition."5 °
In our view, the purpose of the "denial of benefits" clause, as seen
by the above tribunals, is to exclude from the protection of investment
treaties investors with no real economic link to the denying state. The
tribunals considered the clause and its application as a preliminary issue,
either pertaining to jurisdiction or to admissibility. 5' The tribunal in
Waste Management H v. Mexico considered the "denial of benefits"
provision as a condition for commencing the arbitration proceedings. 2
On the burden of proof, the tribunal in Generation Ukraine Inc. v.
Ukraine concluded that the burden of proof lies on the state relying on
the "denial of benefits" clause.13 Nonetheless, it seems that no major
44. Id. at 15.7.
45. Tokios Tokelks v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/18 [M. Mustill,
President (replacing P. Weil), D.M. Price, P. Bernardini] (April 29, 2004) (Decision on
Jurisdiction).
46. Id.at 21.
47. Id.
48. Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
signed on 8 February 1994.
49. Tokios Tokelds, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/18, at 36
50. Id.
51. Some of the tribunals make no distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility.
Cf Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/9 [J.
Paulsson, President, E. Salpius, J. Voss] (Sept. 16, 2003) (Award), 44 ILM 404 (2005).
52. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3 [J. Crawford, President, E.M. G6mez, B.R. Civiletti], (April 30, 2004)
(Award), 43 ILM 967 (2004), 80.
53. Generation Ukraine Inc., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/9, at 15.7.
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controversies related to the application of the "denial of benefits" clause
occurred in cases where investors relied on BITs or the NAFTA.
II.

"DENIAL OF BENEFITS" PROVISION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY

A.

Denial of Benefits Clause and the ECT: Scope and Interpretation

Before discussing the provisions of Article 17 of the ECT, let us
take a brief look at the jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione
personae of the ECT.5 4
The definition of investor under the ECT is provided in Article 1(7)
and includes, with respect to a Contracting Party, besides natural
persons, "company or other organization organized in accordance with
the law applicable in that Contracting Party ....
Investment is broadly defined in Article 1(6) of the ECT as virtually
encompassing "every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by an Investor." 56 Further, the notion of "direct or indirect
control" is explained in Understandings number 3 of the ECT as being
"control in fact, determined after an examination of the actual
circumstances in each situation., 57 The Understandings number 3 further
refers to the burden of proof in cases where there is doubt as to such
control: in these cases, the investor claiming the control has the burden
of proof that such control exists.58
Article 17 of the ECT deals with the specific case of denial of
benefits:

54. It is not the object of this study to embark here on a review of the interpretation
of treaties. The rules of interpretation of treaties set forth in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of the Treaties, Vienna, entered into force on 27 January 1980, are applicable to
the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
clearly states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose."
55. Energy CharterTreaty, art. I(7)(a)(ii) [hereinafter ECT]. With respect to a third
state, the ECT sets forth the same requirements for a company to qualify as an investor.
Id. at art. 1(7)(b).
56. Id. at art. 1(6).
57. Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Lisbon, 16-17 December
1994, Understandings no. 3 [hereinafter Understandings no. 3], available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/userupload/document/EN.pdf, at 26.
58. Id.
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Article 17
Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances
Each Contracting Party reserves the rights to deny the advantages of
this part to:

(1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or
control such entity and if that entity has no substantial business
activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is
organized; or
(2) an Investment, if the denying Contracting Party establishes
that such Investment is an Investment of an Investor of a third
state with or as to which the denying Contracting Party:
(a) does not maintain a diplomatic relationship; or
(b) adopts or maintains measures that:
(i) prohibit transactions with Investors of that state;
or

(ii) would be violated or circumvented if the benefits
to Investors of that state or
of this Part were accorded
59
to their Investments.
Unlike Articles 1(6) and 1(7) of the ECT, which are placed in Part I.
Definitions and Purpose, Article 17 is inserted in Part III. Investment
Promotion and Protection.
The scope of Article 17(1) is to give contracting states the right to
exclude from the benefits conferred by Part III of the ECT alleged
investors owned or controlled by citizens or nationals of third countries,
which are not economically bound to the host state. This is the typical
situation of the so-called "mailbox companies.,, 60 Article 17(2), in turn,
refers to the right of contracting states to deny such benefits to
investments-as defined in Article 1(6) of the ECT-if the denying
contracting party establishes that the investment belongs to an investor of

59.

ECT, supra note 55, at art. 17.

60.

For the same opinion, see Stephen Jagusch and Anthony Sinclair, The Limits of

protection for Investments and Investors under the Energy Charter Treaty, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 93 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed.,

Juris Net 2006).
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a third country with which the denying state (a) maintains no diplomatic
protection, or (b) adopts or maintains certain detrimental economic
measures. The "denial of benefits" clause under the ECT corresponds to
the principle of reciprocity found in international law on foreign
investments and public international law. 61 The wording of the clause
evokes Article 1113 of NAFTA-except for the absence of the
notification and consultation
procedure-and similar provisions found in
63
62
modem BITs and FTAs.

It is pertinent at this point to make a few brief comments on Article
17; these will be further elaborated in the next subsection. Article 17 of
the ECT repeatedly refers to investors "controlled" by citizens or
nationals of a third country. What does "control" under Article 17
mean? The only explanation of the notion of "control" under the ECT is
found in Understandings number 3, as mentioned above. While it is true
that Article 1(6) is in itself an explanation of "investment" under the
ECT, one could wonder whether the notion of "control"-as well as
"ownership"-has different meanings throughout the Treaty, or whether
it has only one meaning, as provided for in Understandings number 3.
Should we import the explanation of "control" under Understandings
number 3 into Article 17? The answer to this question is crucial, as
Understandings number 3 has already mentioned: place the burden of
proof on the investor, should there be doubts as to control.64 One
commentator of the Decision in Plama v. Bulgaria considered that the
clarification under Understandings number 3 "cannot be generalized as
containing a rule that for all questions concerning the control over an
investment the burden of proof is borne by the investor., 65 The Award in
Plama v. Bulgaria clearly stated that "the burden of proof
to establish
66
ownership and control [of the claimant] is on claimant.,

61. The principle is commonly found in the preamble of a BIT. In international law
on foreign investments, see, for example, M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 218 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). In public international law,
see, for example, MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press

2003).
62. In fact, there is a striking resemblance with the "denial of benefits" clause under
the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 15. Of, course, the 2004
U.S. Model BITwas drafted 10 years after the ECT.
63. See, e.g., Canada-ChileTrade Agreement, entered into force on 5 July 1997,
art. G- 13, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/chican-e/Text2-e.asp#Three.
64. Understandings no. 3, supra note 57.
65. H. Essig, Balancing Investors; Interests and State Sovereignty: The ICSIDDecision on JurisdictionPlama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 5 OIL, GAS &
ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE, April 2007, at 13 [hereinafter BalancingInvestors].
66. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A.J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder], 89 (Aug. 27,
2008) (Award).
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When can a state invoke the denial right under Article 17? Is there
a special requirement for such exercise to have full effect on investors?
Is there an automatic application of the "denial of benefits" clause as
soon as the requirements under Article 17 are met? Or should the
denying state proceed with a thorough review of each and every
investment made in its territory and then notify the investors falling
under the situation envisaged in Article 17 of the ECT, namely that they
shall not receive the protection and benefits of the Treaty? This seems to
us to be an impossible task to be achieved by states, especially since
states usually become aware of the circumstances justifying the denial of
benefits only when faced with a claim from a presumptive investor.
Should an objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal based on
Article 17 be sufficient to prevent the alleged investor to benefit from the
protection of the ECT? The tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria dealt with
these issues in the Decision on Jurisdiction and concluded that the
denying state must exercise the "denial of benefits" right in a public
manner which must be reasonably made available to investors.67 In any
case, such exercise has a preemptive effect on investors and their
investments.
What does the ECT mean by "substantial business?" The concept
of "substantial business" is not defined by the ECT, but we can
reasonably assume, based on the "mailbox company" typology, that such
entity has no life of its own, i.e., existing only on papers, without
engaging in any activity. Undoubtedly, such assessment should be
conducted based on the specific facts of each case.
Article 17(2) seems to be as controversial as Article 17(1), although
not yet invoked in the ECT practice. However, unlike Article 17(1),
Article 17(2) makes it clear that the state has the burden of proof for
establishing that an alleged investor falls under one of the situations
mentioned under this "denial of benefits" provision: "the denying
Contracting Party establishes." It seems that, in any case, there would be
fewer controversies on the meaning of Article 17(2).
B.

Article 17 and the ECT Case Law

The Decision on Jurisdiction in Plama v. Bulgaria is the first
decision under the ECT to address in detail the "denial of benefits"
provision under Article 17 of the ECT. The tribunal in Plama v.
Bulgaria ultimately rejected the application of Article 17(1), as the

67. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A.J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder], 1 157 (Feb. 8,
2005) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
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claimant was controlled by a national of a contracting state, and not by a
national of a third state, as required by Article 17(1) of the ECT.68
69
Before Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal in Petrobartv. Kyrgyzstan
rejected respondent's allegation as to the applicability of Article 17(1) to
Petrobart. The tribunal held that the information about Petrobart
"contradicts the view that Petrobart is a company owned or controlled by
citizens or nationals of a state other than the United Kingdom
and that
70
Petrobart has no substantial business in the United Kingdom.,
1.

Jurisdiction or Merits?

The first issue in connection with Article 17(1) of the ECT raised in
the Decision on Jurisdiction in Plama v. Bulgaria was whether the
"denial of benefits" clause belongs to the jurisdiction or to the merits of
the dispute.
The Tribunal interpreted Article 17(1) of the ECT in the light of
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
(VCLT):
The express terms of Article 17 refer to a denial of the advantages "of
this Part," thereby referring to the substantive advantages conferred

upon an investor by Part III of the ECT. The language is
unambiguous; but it is confirmed by the title to Article 17: "Non-

application of Part III in Certain Circumstances" (emphasis
added).... From these terms, interpreted in good faith in accordance
with their ordinary contextual meaning, the denial applies only to
advantages under Part 111.71

Consequently, the tribunal held that the "denial of benefits" clause
concerns only the benefits under Part III and does not, in any way, deny
the applicability of Article 26 of the ECT:
Article 26 provides a procedural remedy for a covered investor's
claims; and it is not physically or juridically part of the ECT's
advantages enjoyed by that investor under Part III. As a matter of
language, it would have been simple to exclude a class of investors
completely from the scope of the ECT as a whole.... This limited
68.

Plama Consortium Limited, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24 (Award).

The Tribunal found that Plama Consortium Limited was ultimately owned and controlled
by Mr. Vautrin, a French national. As France is a Contracting Party to the ECT, Bulgaria
could not rely on Article 17(1) of the ECT to deny to Claimant the benefits of Part III of

the ECT.
69.

Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyzstan, SCC Case No. 126.2003 [H. Danelius, president J.

Smets, 0. Bring], § VIII.3 (March 29, 2005) (Award).
70. Id. at 63.
71. Plama Consortium Limited, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24, T 147
(Decision on Jurisdiction).
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exclusion from Part III for a covered investor ...clearly72requires
Article 26 to be unaffected by the operation of Article 17(1).
In the tribunal's view, to exclude Article 26 of the ECT by way of the
"denial of benefits" clause would mean that
the Contracting State invoking the application of Article 17(1) is the
judge in its own cause. That is a license for injustice; and it treats
a
73
covered investor as if it were not covered under the ECT at all.
The reference to "this part" is a clear indication that the drafters of
the ECT intended to refer to Part ILL of the ECT, to which Article 17
belongs. One could also argue that there is no clear indication that such
wording would exclude the provisions of Part V from the sphere of
Article 17 of the ECT. For instance, comparing the wording of Article
17 of the ECT and Article 1113 of the NAFTA, the latter contains the
reference to "this Chapter." However, there seems to be at least one
visible difference between Article 17 of the ECT and Article 1113 of the
NAFTA: Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA which contains Article 1113
also encompasses the dispute resolution mechanism. This is not the case
under the ECT, as the dispute settlement is contained in Part V.
Nonetheless, the ECT does not regulate the protection of investments
only in Part III, but also throughout the entire Treaty and especially in
Parts IV and V.
Additionally, the arbitration mechanism under Article 26 of Part V
is available only in case of breaches of Part III of the ECT, while other
specific resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation under Article 7 of
the ECT Transit, are dealt with in the particular parts of the ECT. One
could also take a different approach, based on the ICSID case law on the
"denial of benefits" clause. It seems that the ICSID tribunals considered
the "denial of benefits" provision as a preliminary objection based on the
fact that the dispute resolution mechanism contained in investment
treaties is part of the protection offered to investors. The substantive
rights of investors would not be effective without the remedies contained
in the dispute resolution provision. In Siemens v. Argentina, the tribunal
stated that "[a]ccess to these mechanisms is part of the protection offered
under the Treaty. It is part of the treatment of foreign investors. ..." 74

72. Id. at 148.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Siemens AG v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8
[A.R. Sureda, President, C.N. Brower, D.B. Janeiro], 102 (Aug. 3, 2004) (Decision on
Jurisdiction).
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The award in Plama v. Bulgaria restated that "Article 17(1) of the
ECT has no relevance to the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine
",75
Claimant's claims against Respondent under Part III of the Treaty....
Some could see Article 17(1) of the ECT as part of the nationality
requirements or as a "genuine nationality link" pursuant to the
Nottebohm case.7 6 For instance, the Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection included the "denial of benefits" clause under the nationality
provision.77 One commentator considered that Article 17 was not an
issue concerning nationality, as the nationality of the investor had to be
qualified according to Article l(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT.7 8
At the jurisdictional stage, Bulgaria argued that the intention of the
ECT's drafters was to confer on the contracting state "a direct and
unconditional right of denial which may be exercised at any time and in
any manner., 79 The tribunal rejected this view considering that it is
crucial for the investor to have access to a forum that would be able to
determine whether Article 17(1) of the ECT is applicable. But is an
investor barred from bringing a claim under Article 26 of the ECT if one
adopts Bulgaria's point of view? Some commentators consider that this
is not the case: even considering Article 17 of the ECT as a
jurisdictional issue, the potential investor has an available remedy, which
is also arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal has the competence to
determine whether the conditions under Article 17 are met or not. 80
75. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A.J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder], 89 (Aug. 27,
2008) (Award).
76. Affaire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (April 6, 1955).
77. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 30, at n.27 & n.28.
78. But could one draw a parallel between the "denial of benefits" clause and the
requirement for investments made in accordance with the laws of the host state? Such
qualification appears sometimes in the definition of investment, while other BITs have a
special provision on this qualification of investments. However, the effect of such a
provision is the same, irrespective of where it is placed: to restrict the benefits of the BIT
only to investments which are made in accordance with the laws of the Host State. The
"denial of benefits" clause, irrespective where it is placed, has the same function-only
with regard to investors. The requirement for investments to be made in accordance with
the laws of the Host State restricts the definition of investment and, consequently, the
applicability ratione materiae of the BIT. Potential investors, qualified as such pursuant
to Article 1(7) of the ECT must satisfy the requirement under Article 17 of the ECT. It
appears, at least from this perspective, that one could argue-leaving aside the case law
and commentaries-that the purpose of the "denial of benefits" clause is to restrict the
applicability rationepersonae of the ECT.
79. Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/03/24 [C.F. Salans, President, A.J. van den Berg, V.V. Veeder], 144 (Feb. 8,
2005) (Decision on Jurisdiction).
80. Cf Laurence Shore, The jurisdictionproblem in Energy Charter Treaty claims,
10 INT'L APB. L. REv., June 2007, at 63; James Chalker, Making the Energy Charter
Treaty Too Investor Friendly: Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, 3
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., Dec. 2006, at 15.
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Exercise of the Denial of Benefits Right

On jurisdiction, the tribunal had to decide whether the right
conferred upon the states under Article 17(1) must be first exercised by
the denying state in order to produce effects or whether it operates
automatically, as contended by Bulgaria.
The tribunal departed from the idea that the existence of a mere
right is different than the exercise of that right, and held that the right of
the contracting parties under Article 17(1) of the ECT must be exercised
in order to have full effects:
a Contracting Party has a right under Article 17(1) ECT to deny a
covered investor the advantages under Part III;
but it is not required
8
to exercise that right; and it may never do so. 1
As to the options a state has for exercising such right, the arbitrators,
relying on the ECT's object and purpose, considered that
[t]he exercise would necessarily be associated with publicity or other
notice so as to become reasonably available to investors and their
advisers. To this end, a declaration in a Contracting State's official
gazette could suffice; or a statutory provision in a Contracting State's
investment or other laws; or even an exchange of letters with a
particular investor or class of investors.... By itself, Article 17(1)
ECT is at best only half a notice; without further reasonable notice of
its exercise by the host state, its terms tell investor
little; and for all
82
practical purposes, something more is needed.
There is no doubt that the "denial of benefits" right must be exercised by
the denying state. The silent issue of Article 17 is how and when to
exercise this right. The Decision on Jurisdiction in Plama v. Bulgaria
suggests that such exercise must be made publicly and in an effective
way so it becomes available to investors.83 In any case, the exercise of
the denial right may only have prospective effect, as suggested by the
scope and purpose of the ECT. The tribunal relied on the provision of
Article 1113 of the NAFTA concluding that this solution is supported by
the wording of the "denial of benefits" clause under the NAFTA. Article
1113 of the NAFTA requires the denying contracting state to give prior
notification to the contracting state of which the entity in question is
asserting to be a national and to initiate the consultation proceedings.
81. Plama Consortium Limited, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24,
155
(Decision on Jurisdiction).
82. Id. at 157. The Tribunal then referred to the notification and consultation
procedure provided for by Article 1113 of the NAFTA and found that this supports its
interpretation of Article 17(1).
83. Id. at 157.
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Article 17 of the ECT contains no such requirements. While the tribunal
saw Article 1113 as supporting its finding, one could also see the
absence of the notification and consultation requirement in Article 17 as
the intention of contracting parties to the ECT to increase the
prerogatives of the denying contracting party.
One commentator of the Plama Decision suggested that states
should enact "a law containing an abstract and general denial of benefits
provision." 84 One could wonder why a state should enact such law when
the ECT-which is part of the legislation of the respective statecontains the same abstract provision in Article 17. The tribunal in Plama
85
v. Bulgaria considered Article 17 to be "at best only half a notice.,
One critic sees this approach of the tribunal as a guidance for contracting
states: a prudent state will make a declaration in its official gazette
regarding the exercise of the rights under Article 17 of the ECT.86 On
the other hand, could one consider this blanket "denial of benefits"
ECT which states that "[n]o
clause as conflicting with Article 46 of the
87
reservations may be made to this Treaty?,
3.

Retrospective or Prospective Effect

In determining whether the exercise of the denial right under Article
17(1) of the ECT has retrospective or prospective effects, the Decision in
Plama v. Bulgariareferred to the purpose of the ECT as stated in Article
2, i.e., to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field. 8 As a
result, an investor cannot plan its "long-term" investment if the exercise
of the denial of benefits right has retrospective effect:
In the Tribunal's view, therefore, the object and purpose of the ECT
suggest that the right's exercise should not have retrospective
effect.89

For the Investor, the practical difference between prospective and
retrospective effect is sharp. The former accords with the good faith

84. BalancingInvestors, supra note 65, at 10.
85. Plama Consortium Limited, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24,

(Decision on Jurisdiction).
86. Shore, supra note 80, at 63.
87. ECT, supra note 55, at art. 46 (Reservations).
88. Id. at art. 2.
89. Plama Consortium Limited, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24,
(Decision on Jurisdiction).

157
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interpretation of the relevant wording of Article 17(l)9 in the light of
the ECT's object and purpose, but the latter does not. 0
According to the Tribunal, to give retrospective effect to the "denial of
benefits" clause would breach investors' legitimate expectations and
would contradict the object and purpose of the ECT as stated in Article 2.
It would also discourage potential investors and the "long-term
cooperation" envisaged by the Treaty. But one could also read Article 2
of the ECT in the sense that it is encouraging the retrospective effect of
Article 17(1) of the ECT. As one critic of the Plama Decision asserts,
"[o]ne could argue that the retrospective effect of Article 17(1) would
benefit 'long-term cooperation' by encouraging investors to be upfront
about ownership, nationality and citizenship." 91 Article 2 states that the
purpose of the ECT is to promote long-term cooperation in the energy
field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits. In this sense, one
may see the availability of the substantive and procedural rights under
the ECT as a reciprocal privilege conferred only by the accession to the
ECT.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The "denial of benefits" clause was seen as a safeguard against
"free riders" or as a "method to counteract nationality planning" or to
preserve the reciprocity in the relationship between two countries.
Irrespective of how ones calls it, the end purpose of the clause is to
exclude from the protection offered by investment/trade treaties those
investors to whom, in normal circumstances, contracting states would not
accord protection. Article 17 of the ECT that provides for the denial of
benefits right of the contracting states is in line with similar clauses
found in modem bilateral and multilateral investment/trade treaties.
It was recently tested in practice in the dispute between Plama
Consortium Limited and Bulgaria. The Decision in Plama v. Bulgaria is
at least interesting because it is the first decision under the ECT to
discuss in detail the scope and application of Article 17(1) and it takes a
different approach than the previous ICSID tribunals. Whether future
ECT tribunals will take a similar attitude on the "denial of benefits"
provision remains to be seen. For investors, the decision seems to
protect them against arbitrary and unfair conduct of the state in
exercising the denial right; for states, it might force them to adopt
blanket clauses in application of Article 17(1) of the ECT in order to
meet the threshold laid down in the Plama Decision.

90. Id. at 164.
91. Chalker, supra note 80, at 17.
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